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Abstract 
Why would people pay more for a $50 gift certificate than for the opportunity to receive either a 
$50 or a $100 gift certificate with equal probability? This paper examines three mechanisms for 
this recently documented “Uncertainty Effect” (UE): (i) awareness of the better outcome 
devalues the worse one, (ii) instructions in the original demonstration of the UE were 
misunderstood, and (iii) people exhibit direct-risk-aversion, that is, actual distaste for 
uncertainty. Experiment 1 documents the UE in a design where participants in the certainty 
condition were also aware of the better outcome, eliminating the first explanation.  Experiment 2 
shows that most participants understand the instruction and that the UE is not caused by the few 
who do not.  Overall, the UE is proven robust, large (prospects are valued at 66% the value of 
their worst outcome) and widespread (at least 62% of participants exhibit it).   
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Why are people risk averse?  This question has received considerable attention by 
decision making researchers, both theoretical and empirical, going back at least to 
Bernoulli (1738). Despite the great number of theories that have been proposed to explain risk 
aversion, it is striking that the notion that people simply dislike uncertainty, that is, that 
uncertainty itself influences utility, is not part of any mainstream theory.1   
Widely accepted risk aversion theories, including Expected Utility and Prospect Theory, 
arrive at risk aversion only indirectly, as a side-effect of how outcomes are valued and/or 
probabilities judged.  In Expected Utility Theory, for instance, people are risk averse because 
they satiate from consumption and hence potential increases in wealth are valued less than 
potential decreases.   
Despite important conceptual differences between Expected Utility and Prospect Theory, 
then, they share (together with all mainstream theories of risk aversion) the reliance on “indirect-
risk-aversion.”  Importantly, all such theories makes the following falsifiable prediction: an 
individual cannot be so risk averse as to value a risky prospect less than the prospect’s worst 
possible outcome. 
A recent paper by (Gneezy, List, & Wu, 2006, henceforth GLW), however, obtained 
evidence that contradicted this consensual prediction.  In several between participant studies they 
find that people are willing to pay less, on average, for a binary lottery than they are willing to 
pay for its worst outcome, a finding they coin the “Uncertainty Effect” (henceforth, UE).  For 
example, they find that people are willing to pay an average of $26 for a $50 gift certificate for 
                                     
1 A small theoretical literature has considered the possibility of direct utility from risk, primarily to account for 
gambling  (see e.g. Conlisk, 1993; Diecidue, Schmidt, & Wakker, 2004; Fishburn, 1980; Royden, Suppes, & Walsh, 
1959). 
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Barnes and Noble, but only $16 for a lottery that pays either a $50 or a $100 gift certificate with 
equal probability. 
Considering the potential importance of the findings by GLW, posing a direct challenge 
to the overarching paradigm currently used to understand risk aversion, in this paper I set out to 
distinguish among three possible causes behind them.  The first and most interesting mechanism 
that may have lead to GLW’s findings is that uncertainty enters directly into people’s utility 
function, that people exhibit what I shall refer to as “direct-risk-aversion.”  The other two, to be 
discussed in some detail below, are (i) that awareness of the lotteries’ high value outcome 
diminished the perceived value of the low-value one and hence of the lottery as a whole, and (ii) 
that respondents erroneously believed the lottery could result in a payment of $0.   
In all of the multiple demonstrations of the Uncertainty Effect by GLW, participants 
evaluating lotteries were shown their two outcomes while those evaluating outcomes to be 
received with certainty were shown just one.  This means that the manipulation of uncertainty 
was fully confounded with the number of outcomes presented to participants.  As it turns out, 
this could -independently of uncertainty- explain the Uncertainty Effect.   
Abundant research has examined the differences between evaluations performed on 
single vs. multiple items (e.g. Bazerman, Loewenstein, & White, 1992; Bazerman, Moore, 
Tenbrunsel, Wade-Benzoni, & Blount, 1999; Hsee, 1996, 1998; Hsee & Zhang, 2004; List, 
2002), and (Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount, & Bazerman, 1999) for a review.  Particularly relevant 
in this “joint vs. separate evaluation” literature is the finding that the willingness-to-pay (WTP) 
for low quality items drops when they are evaluated jointly with similar but superior ones.  For 
example, Hsee (1996) reports that participants were willing to pay $24 for a dictionary with 
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10,000 words when they were evaluating just that dictionary, but only $19 if they were also 
evaluating a dictionary with 20,000 words.   
The fact that the lottery includes a similar yet superior outcome, therefore, may diminish 
the perceived value of the worst outcome.  This mechanism provides a plausible 
uncertainty-independent explanation for the Uncertainty Effect.  Some patterns in the data 
obtained by GLW suggest that the use of separate evaluation influenced their results at least 
somewhat.  For example, the median WTP to receive $100 and $200 in a year was the same 
amount: $50 (see table I in GLW); such inadequate sensitivity to changes on the quantity of the 
good being evaluated is typical of separate (but not joint) evaluations. 
The experiments presented in this paper eliminated this confound by asking participants 
in the certainty condition to value both the low and the high value outcome, i.e. by conducting 
joint evaluations in both conditions. 
Another possible cause behind the findings of GLW is that the lottery descriptions they 
employed did not unambiguously rule out a $0 payment.  One of their lottery descriptions, for 
instance, was “…a lottery that pays $50 or $100 with equal probability…” (GLW, pp.1304).  
While the authors were referring to a lottery that would for certain pay one of these two 
outcomes, their description is consistent with a lottery that could result in a payment of $0, such 
as one paying $0 with 98% probability, and $50 or $100 each with 1% probability.2   
The possibility that the findings by GLW were caused by participants’ misunderstanding 
of the lottery has been put forward by two independent set of researchers, (Keren & Willemsen, 
Forthcoming) and (Ortmann, Prokosheva, Rydval, & Hertwig, 2008).  To address this potential 
                                     
2 In some experiments they used the description “A lottery ticket that gives you a 50 percent chance at a $50 gift 
certificate, and a 50 percent chance at a $100 gift certificate”. This could be interpreted as consisting of two 
independent 50:50 draws, one for $50 and one for $100, making a $0 (and a $150) outcome possible.   
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explanation, Experiment 1 in this paper modified the lottery description to more definitely rule 
out a $0 payment, and Experiment 2 included comprehension questions about the lottery.  
    
EXPERIMENT 1 – THE UNCERTAINTY EFFECT WITH JOINT EVALUATION 
 
The design of experiment 1 makes two notable modifications to those conducted by 
GLW: participants in the certainty condition indicated their WTP for two rather than a single 
outcome, and the lottery description was modified slightly, seeking to eliminate the possibility 
that participants may believe a $0 payment is possible.   
   
Method 
Two hundred and seventy-nine participants, primarily University of Pennsylvania 
undergraduates, answered hypothetical willingness-to-pay questions as part of a series of surveys 
and experiments they completed in exchange of monetary payment at Wharton’s Behavioral Lab. 
The experiment consisted of a 6x2 between participant design, where six conditions 
presenting different pairs of low and high value items were crossed with whether participants 
indicated their WTP for each of the two items (certainty condition) or for the corresponding 
50:50 lottery (uncertainty condition).  Each participant evaluated only one item-pair under one 
elicitation mode. 
The six item-pairs were constructed by combining gift certificates for Barnes and Noble 
(for $50 or $100), gift certificates for Pod, a high-end Asian Fusion restaurant located near the 
University of Pennsylvania (also for $50 or $100), and three-course meals, also at Pod, for either 
2 or 4 people (see Table 1). 
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It is fundamental that participants in the certainty condition are aware of both items 
before indicating their WTP for the first one (otherwise the first elicitation would not be 
performed under joint evaluation).  This was accomplished with the following instructions:  
We are interested in how much you would be willing to pay for two different items.  In particular we will ask you 
how much you would be willing to pay for <low-value-item> and for <high-value-item>.  
 
If you could only buy the <low-value-item>, what is the highest amount of money you would pay for it?____ 
If you could only buy the <high-value-item>, what is the highest amount of money you would pay for it?____ 
 
As mentioned above, the lottery description was modified to reduce ambiguity as to the 
possibility of a $0 payment. In particular, it stated: 
We are interested in how much you would be willing to pay for a lottery ticket that will for sure pay one of two 
possible rewards (both are equally likely).  
It will either pay <low-value-item> or <high-value-item>. 
 
What is the highest amount of money you would pay for this lottery?___ 
 
The study was part of a series of experiments completed by participants in individual 
cubicles with personal computers.  Participants were assigned sequentially into conditions based 
on the order in which they signed-on to the experiment.  Data was collected over several 
experimental sessions with condition assignment being randomized within sessions. 
 
Results 
Table 1 summarizes the results for Experiment 1.  The Uncertainty Effect is observed 
both for the average and the median WTP for all six item-pairs.  Four of the six differences in 
means are statistically significant at the 5% level, while two are marginally not significant at the 
10% level.  Four of the six Wilcoxon tests are significant at the 5% level and the remaining two 
are significant at the 10% level.  
*** Table 1 *** 
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The ratio between the WTP for the lottery and the WTP for the low value item gives us 
an indication of how large the Uncertainty Effect is.  The average ratio across the six item-pairs 
for the WTP means is 65%, indicating that participants were willing to pay 2/3 as much for the 
lotteries as they were willing to pay for their lowest possible outcome.  The average ratio for the 
median WTP is a striking 38%. 
It is worth noting that estimates of the Uncertainty Effect arising from central-tendency 
measures, such as mean or median valuation, are conservative. They are conservative because if 
some participants do not exhibit direct-risk-aversion, they will value the lottery above its low 
value outcome and hence cancel out, in central tendency measures, the low valuation of those 
who do exhibit direct-risk-aversion.  In fact, even if a substantial (and statistically significant) 
share of participants exhibited the Uncertainty Effect, the average WTP for the lottery may be 
higher than the average WTP for the low outcome, if just a few participants value the lottery 
sufficiently above its low value outcome.   
Although in Experiment 1 central tendency measures did exhibit the UE, it is 
nevertheless worth assessing how widespread it is across participants.  This calculation is not 
entirely straightforward in the present setting because the design is between participants and 
hence only one of the two relevant valuations are observed for any given participant (i.e., we 
cannot simply count the number of participants giving a higher WTP for the low value item than 
for the lottery).  We can, nevertheless, learn quite a bit by comparing the distributions of 
valuations across conditions.   
Figure 1 plots the cumulative distribution of the WTP for the $50 Barnes and Noble gift 
certificate and for the 50:50 lottery for a $50 or $100 gift certificate as a demonstration.  The 
figure shows -for instance- that for around 50% of participants the WTP for the lottery was less 
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than $20, while not a single participant’s WTP was lower than $20 for the $50 gift certificate; in 
other words, around half the participants valued the lottery less than the person who was willing 
to pay the least for its worst outcome.  This pattern suggests that the UE is quite prevalent, and 
not driven by a few extreme responses.     
Employing the distributions depicted in Figure 1 we can precisely estimate the share of 
participants who exhibited the UE, if we assume that the relative ranking of valuations across 
participants is constant across conditions, that is, if we assume that if a participant pays more for 
the low value item than another participant does, then she would also pay more for the lottery. 
This would mean that the person paying the most for the lottery is assumed to be the person 
paying the most for the low value item, the one paying the second highest amount for the lottery 
to be the second highest payer for the low-value item, and so on. 
Under this assumption, the point at which both distributions cross is the share of people 
who are wiling to pay less for the lottery than for the low-value item.  In Figure 1 the cumulative 
distributions cross at roughly 80%, suggesting that around 80% of participants exhibit the 
Uncertainty Effect.  The crossing point for the other five item-pairs ranges between 70% and 
80% (corresponding figures available from the author’s website).   
***Figure 1*** 
Considering that the assumption on which these estimates rest cannot be tested, I also 
estimated an alternative which assesses the lowest possible share of participants exhibiting the 
UE.  To this end the matching of participants’ between conditions is done in a manner that 
minimizes the total number of ‘violations’.   
To illustrate the procedure imagine a situation where there were three participants per 
condition, with the valuations of the lottery being $10, $20 & $30, and the valuations of the low 
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value item being $15, $25 & 35.  For expository purposes let’s begin again with the assumption 
that the ranking of valuations is constant across conditions.  Under such assumption 100% of 
participants exhibit the UE (since the lowest, median and highest valuation of the lottery are 
lower than the corresponding lowest, median and highest valuation of the low-value item).   
In contrasts, the lowest possible share of participants exhibiting the UE is just 1/3.  If the 
participant paying $35 for the low-value outcome was the one paying $10 for the lottery, and the 
ones paying $15 and $25 for the low-value outcome were willing to pay $20 & 30 for the lottery, 
then only one participant would exhibit the UE. 
I conducted analogous calculations for the distributions of valuations for each of the six 
item-pairs.  The lower bound on the share of participants exhibiting the UE ranged between 52% 
and 70% across the six pairs, with an overall-mean of 62%.   
In sum, if we assume that the ranking of valuations of the lottery and the low-value item 
is the same across subjects between conditions, then the best estimate of the share of participants 
exhibiting the UE is about 80%.  If we are not willing to make such an assumption, we can place 
the lower bound on such share at 62%.   
The main findings from Experiment 1, then, are that the Uncertainty Effect: (i) is not 
caused (at least exclusively) by the fact that the lottery contains a superior outcome which may 
reduce the valuation of the low-value one, (ii) is large in magnitude, and (iii) is widespread 
across participants.   
Study 2 will further address the possibility that people value the binary lottery less than 
its actual worst outcome not because of direct-risk-aversion, but because they incorrectly believe 
that the lottery may result in a $0 payoff. 
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EXPERIMENT 2 – DO PARTICIPANTS UNDERSTAND THE LOTTERY? 
 
If participants in UE studies erroneously believe that, like in most lotteries, a $0 payoff is 
possible, it would no longer be surprising that they would pay less for the lottery than for the low 
value outcome.  Working papers by Keren & Willemsen (2008) and by Ortmann et al. (2008) 
propose this is all that’s behind the findings by GLW.   
Both papers assess the impact of modifying instructions and/or the randomizing 
procedure behind the lottery on the prevalence of the UE.  They both find that these 
modifications do (sometimes) attenuate and even eliminate the UE for the average valuation 
(though recall the previous discussion regarding the limitations of inferences about the 
Uncertainty Effect based on mean and median valuations). 3 
 Keren & Willemsen, also find that a substantial share of participants erroneously answer 
a comprehension question about the lottery and that only for these participants is the UE 
observed.  In particular, they asked: “True/False:  The lottery offered me, with 100% certainty, at 
least 50 euros in Book certificates,” and found that only for the roughly 45% (on average across 
experiments) of participants answering false was WTP for the lottery lower than the WTP for the 
low value outcome.  These results are consistent with the UE being driven by misunderstood 
instructions rather than by a direct distaste for uncertainty.  
Their design and analysis contain two potential problems, however, both are addressed 
by Experiment 2 in this paper.  The first is that their comprehension question may have itself 
been difficult to comprehend by participants.  The second is that the comprehension question 
(and resulting participant exclusion) was performed only in the uncertainty condition, possibly 
                                     
3 Keren and Willemsen emphasize that in their experiments they employed coin flips –an intuitive randomization 
device- to describe the lotteries, but this is an unlikely explanation for the difference in results, as GLW also did (see 
appendixes 2 and 4 in GLW).  
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introducing bias by engaging in selective elimination of observations in only one of the two 
conditions being compared.  It is hence possible that, despite their findings, the UE is fully 
caused by a direct distaste for uncertainty. 
In light of this, Experiment 2 contains two alternative comprehension questions.  In one 
condition participants were directly asked to state the lowest possible payoff of the lottery, 
providing a simple assessment of the share of participants who erroneously believed they could 
earn less than what the lottery actually could pay.  In the other condition participants were 
instead asked the true/false question.  In addition, in Experiment 2 all participants indicated their 
WTP both for an item to be obtained with certainty and for a lottery.  By comparing the WTP for 
the sure-thing item across participants answering the comprehension questions correctly and 
incorrectly, we can estimate the statistical bias introduced by dropping observations only from 
the uncertainty condition. 
 
Method 
One hundred and ninety-six participants, primarily University of Pennsylvania 
undergraduates, participated in this study as part of a series of surveys and experiments.  The 
experiment consisted of a simple two-condition between-participant design, where the 
comprehension question was systematically manipulated between participants.  All questions 
were over hypothetical scenarios. 
All participants begun by indicating their WTP, today, for $100 to be received in a year.  
They then all indicated their WTP for a 50:50 lottery that paid either a $50 Barnes and Noble gift 
certificate, or a $100 one (employing the lottery description from Experiment 1).   
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Participants were then asked one of two comprehension questions.  Half the participants 
were asked: “True/False: The lottery from the previous question offered me, with 100% 
certainty, at least $50 in Gift Certificates” while the other half were asked “What was the lowest 
possible payment the lottery could pay?” and were presented with a multiple choice set of 
answers that included values between $0 and $250 in gift certificates, in steps of $25.  
Importantly, participants could no longer see the lottery description when they were asked the 
comprehension question. 
Results 
Table 2 summarizes the results from Experiment 2.  Arguably the most important finding 
is that of the 97 participants assigned to the multiple choice question, 92% (n=89) correctly 
answered that $50 was the lowest possible payoff, and that not a single participant answered $0, 
the most relevant value associated with misunderstanding.  Two of the remaining 8 participants 
answered $25, while the other six answered a number greater than $50.  If anything, this 
suggests that participants who misunderstand the lottery over-estimate its worst outcome; more 
likely, rather than signaling lack of understanding of the lottery per-se, missing the 
comprehension question signals not having taken the task seriously enough.  
It is worth, nevertheless, to assess the extent to which participants such as these ones may 
be behind the UE.  Table 2 shows that the WTP for the lottery by the eight participants giving an 
erroneous answer to the comprehension question was in fact much lower (M=15.5) than among 
the 89 answering it correctly (M=31.1).  
It is tempting to interpret this result as suggesting that misunderstood instructions do 
indeed play a role in the UE.  Such interpretation of the difference in WTP for the lottery, 
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however, relies on the assumption that participants who answer the lottery question correctly and 
incorrectly do not differ in their (reported) valuation of items to be received for certain.   
This assumption, however, is contradicted by the results from Experiment 2.  Participants 
giving an incorrect answer to the comprehension question for the lottery had also for $100 to be 
received in one year a dramatically lower WTP than did participants correctly answering the 
comprehension question (M=15.74 vs. M=57.98).  This exemplifies the problems associated with 
comparing the conditional mean of participants in one treatment to the unconditional mean of 
participants in another.     
The lower panel of Table 2 repeats the analyses just presented for participants assigned to 
the True/False question.  A higher share of participants answered false to this comprehension 
question (21 out of 99, or 21.2%) than the 8.2% that missed the multiple choice one, a 
statistically significant difference Z = 2.56, p = .011.  This is consistent with the proposition that 
the True/False question was itself difficult to understand, especially considering that an answer 
of $50 (or above) to the multiple choice question is logically equivalent to answering true for the 
True/False question.  
As was the case for the multiple choice question, participants erroneously answering the 
True/False question gave a lower median response for the WTP for $100 in a year than did 
participants correctly answering the comprehension question (medians of $30 and $50 
respectively).  The mean WTPs do not show this pattern ($52.43 and $47.38 respectively); this is 
driven by two participants who answered false and gave a WTP of $200 (again, for $100 in a 
year).  If only answers of $100 or less are considered (in both conditions), the same pattern is 
present: average WTP for $100 in a year is lower among participants answering the true/false 
question incorrectly (M = 33.11) than those answering correctly (M = 45.34). 
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Experiment 2, in sum, suggests that the mechanism behind the Uncertainty Effect is not 
the erroneous belief that lotteries may pay a counterfactually low outcome.  It also highlights the 
importance of the conducting symmetric comprehension checks across conditions in order to 
avoid statistical bias caused by, for example, eliminating participants who do not take the task 
seriously only from one condition. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The results from this paper suggest that the Uncertainty Effect, valuing a risky prospect 
below the value of its worst possible outcome, occurs as the consequence of people exhibiting 
what I have referred to as “direct-risk-aversion”, that is, risk aversion which does not arise 
indirectly as a consequence of how people value outcomes or weight probabilities, but instead, 
directly from a literal distaste for uncertainty. 
Importantly, the Uncertainty Effect is found to be quite large, with the average valuation 
of a lottery over two outcomes being just 65% of the average valuation of its lowest outcome, 
and widespread, with a lower bound on the percentage of participants exhibiting it being 62%. 
While the notion of direct-risk-aversion has been considered before (within frameworks 
regarding the “utility from gambling”, see footnote 1), it has not entered our mainstream 
understanding of risk aversive behavior.  The robustness, magnitude and widespread nature of 
the Uncertainty Effect suggest this may be an important shortcoming in our current 
understanding of risky choice. 
Future work on direct-risk-aversion should strive to make progress on two different 
directions.  The first is in exploring its ability to account for real-world behaviors that are at odds 
with existing theories of risk.   The popularity of insurance for small-stakes risks, such as 
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warranties for electronics, low deductibles or mail-insurance, is one promising possibility. Both 
Expected Utility and Prospect Theory predict that people should not purchase insurance over 
small stakes risks, and yet these seem to be extremely popular.  Direct-risk-aversion provides a 
plausible explanation.   
The challenge, of course, is in avoiding the tautological argument of alluding to direct-
risk-aversion to ‘explain’ otherwise puzzling risk averse behavior.  This leads to the second 
direction in which future research on direct-risk-aversion could make important progress: 
understanding what determines the perceived riskiness of, and hence aversion to a given 
prospect.   
It seems likely that factors that have previously thought to influence risky choice 
independently, such as familiarity (Song & Schwarz, 2008; Weber, Siebenmorgen, & Weber, 
2005), emotions (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001), and ambiguity aversion (Ellsberg, 
1961; Fox & Tversky, 1995), for example, all ultimately influence it by affecting the subjective 
sense of ‘riskiness’ of a prospect in turn influencing decisions via direct-risk-aversion.  Research 
exploring this and related issues could reshape our understanding of decision making under 
uncertainty. 
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Table 1. Experiment 1 - Willingness-to-pay for binary lotteries and for their respective outcomes (between subjects)
Certainty
Condition
Uncertainty
Condition
mean 84.2 43.2 23.2 <.001 23 22
median 90 47 12.5 .005
mean 67.6 34.5 25.7 .133 23 23
median 65 30 15 .065
mean 57.8 33.7 23.9 .104 23 23
median 60 35 10 .019
mean 78.5 40.8 25.1 .006 23 20
median 80 45 20 .005
mean 91.0 35.6 24.5 .044 24 24
median 100 40 12.5 .086
mean 97.7 46.9 30.7 .016 24 23
median 85 42.5 20 .001
Observations (N)
Bookstore: $50 certificate
Restaurant: $100 certificate Restaurant: $50 certificate
Restaurant: $50 certificate
Restaurant: free meal for twoRestaurant: free meal for four
Bookstore: $50 certificateRestaurant: free meal for four
Bookstore: $100 certificate
p-value of lottery
vs. low outcome
t-test/Wilcoxon
LotteryLow Outcome
High 
OutcomeLow Value outcome High Value outcome
Restaurant: $100 certificate
Bookstore: $50 certificateBookstore: $100 certificate
 
 
 
Table 2. Experiment 2 - Willingness-to-Pay by answer to comprehension questions
Willingness to Pay (WTP) for:
Mean Median Mean Median
Comprehension Question:
Multiple choice
Correct (N=89) 57.98 50 31.13 25
Incorrect (N=8) 15.75 10 15.50 10
Total (N=97) 54.50 50 29.84 25
True/False
Correct (N=78) 47.38 50 28.24 25
Incorrect (N=21) 52.43 30 19.04 10
Total (N=99) 48.45 50 26.29 25
Receiving $100 
in a year
Lottery $50/$100 gift 
certificate
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